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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                         
No. 09-2739




JOHN YOST, WARDEN, F.C.I. LORETTO
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-00081)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant 
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 30, 2009   
Before:  SCIRICA, CHIEF JUDGE, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed : October 9, 2009  
                             
 OPINION
                            
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Raymond Jackson, a federal prisoner incarcerated in
Pennsylvania, was indicted in United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, along with eleven co-defendants, in connection with his participation in a
2drug enterprise that engaged in murder, robbery and extortion.  See Jackson v. United
States, 2002 WL 1968328, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2002).  After the trial began,
Jackson pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to murder George Ford in aid of the
racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), and two counts of using
and carrying a weapon in relation to the murders of Greg Hawkins and Sheila Berry,
respectively, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  See id.   Jackson’s crimes exposed him
to a term of imprisonment of 54 years, but, in exchange for his guilty plea, the
government agreed to a term of imprisonment of only 35 years.  See id.  The agreement
also provided that Jackson would give up his right to a direct appeal of the judgment of
sentence, and right to challenge his conviction pursuant to a motion to vacate sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See id.  Jackson was sentenced on July 7, 1999 to a term of
imprisonment of 420 months.
Despite the waiver of appellate rights, Jackson filed a section 2255 motion
in the sentencing court at D.C. Civ. No. 01 Civ. 3967, contending that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance in negotiating the guilty plea and sentence, and in not
challenging the conviction on direct appeal.  See id.  The sentencing court denied the
motion after reviewing the plea agreement and concluding that Jackson’s knowing and
voluntary waiver of his right to appeal a stipulated sentence was enforceable.  See id. at
*2.  The court held that Jackson was competent to enter the plea, understood the charges
and the penalties that attached to each, and admitted the facts supporting the charges.  See
3id.  As to the weapons charges, in particular, Jackson admitted that he had provided the
guns to be used to kill Hawkins and Berry, knowing the purpose for which they would be
used, and in fact they were used for murder.  See id.  Jackson appealed the dismissal of
his section 2255 motion to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, C.A. No. 02-1649, and
that court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the sentencing court that the appellate
waiver was enforceable.  The Second Circuit, on March 7, 2006, denied Jackson’s motion
to file a second or successive section 2255 motion grounded on the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
On August 30, 2007, Jackson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, see Jackson v. Sniezek, 2008 WL 4748247 (M.D. Pa. October 27, 2008). 
In this habeas corpus petition, he alleged that his two firearms convictions were invalid
under Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).  Jackson’s “Bailey”argument was
that, because the substantive charges against him for the murders of Hawkins and Berry
were dismissed as part of his plea agreement, the firearms convictions each lacked a
predicate conviction.  The district judge dismissed the habeas corpus petition for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that Jackson’s remedy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and sentence.  Our decision
in In re: Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) (petitioner who asserted that his
       Evidently, Jackson also unsuccessfully sought authorization to raise this claim in the1
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in December of 2008.
4
conviction was rendered invalid by Bailey may seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241), did
not apply because Jackson did not argue that his conduct did not satisfy the “use” prong
of section 924(c)(1), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bailey  See Jackson, 2008
WL 4748247, at * 3.  Jackson did not appeal this decision.
At issue in the instant appeal, Jackson filed another petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this time in United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania.  Relying on the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
section 924(c)(1)(A)’s “except” clause in United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.
2008), Jackson raised a new claim that he was actually innocent of the mandatory
consecutive sentences he received under section 924(c).   Following the filing of a Report1
and Recommendation by the Magistrate Judge, the District Court, in an order entered on
May 8, 2009, denied the habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that
Jackson’s remedy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not inadequate or ineffective. 
Jackson has timely appealed.
Our Clerk advised Jackson that his appeal was subject to summary
affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to submit
argument in writing, and he has done so.  We have reviewed that submission.
       A second or successive section 2255 motion must be authorized by a court of2
appeals to contain: “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense;
or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).  Jackson’s
claim does not involve newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law.
5
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Under Third Circuit LAR
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that
no substantial question is presented by the appeal.  Our review is plenary.  United States
v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1995). 
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no
substantial question is presented by this appeal.  A motion to vacate sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive means to challenge collaterally a federal conviction or
sentence.  Under the explicit terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless a section 2255 motion
would be “inadequate or ineffective,” even a habeas corpus petition cannot be entertained
by a court.  See Application of Galante, 473 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971).  Section
2255 is not inadequate or ineffective simply because Jackson is prevented by the
gatekeeping requirements of the statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), from litigating his most
recent challenge to his conviction and sentence.   “It is the efficacy of the remedy, not the2
personal inability to use it, that is determinative.”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner,
290 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citing Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722,
727 (D.C. Cir.1986).  Moreover, the safety valve provided under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
       Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides that:3
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other
provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for
an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly
or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime-
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5
years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  The applicable sentence must run
consecutively to any other term of imprisonment.  See id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  The
defendant in Whitley was subject to a mandatory minimum of 15 years imprisonment
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  He also was subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence of 10
years pursuant to section 924(c).  529 F.3d at 152.  The Second Circuit held that, read
literally, the “except” clause meant that he was subject only to the 15-year mandatory
minimum of the Armed Career Criminal Act; the 10-year mandatory consecutive weapons
sentence did not apply.  See id. at 153.  Jackson’s claim, based as it is on Whitley, is not
that he was convicted of conduct later deemed to be noncriminal by a change in law, and
thus he may not resort to habeas corpus.  Furthermore, in United States v. Abbott, 574
F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), we joined the majority of other circuits which have flatly
rejected Whitley’s reasoning.  Abbott holds that mandatory consecutive sentences for
section 924(c) violations do apply to a defendant who receives a longer mandatory
6
narrow, see Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251, and would not apply here because Jackson does
not claim that he was convicted for conduct later deemed to be noncriminal by a change
in law.  See id. at 251.3
minimum under the ACCA.  We reasoned that a comparison of the current and prior
versions of section 924(c) establish that Congress intended that an additional sentence be
imposed consecutively to any other term of imprisonment when a crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime involves a firearm.  574 F.3d at 208.  Read in context, section
924(c)’s “except” clause refers only to other minimum sentences that may be imposed for
violations of section 924(c), not separate offenses.  See id.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the
District Court dismissing Jackson’s habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction.
